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Steve Cheung's avatar

You’re comparing apples and oranges here.

You’re asking about how people would make their actual lunch choice in the moment. But you’re comparing that with how people would choose to signal about how they might make their potential divorce decision to be applied a future time. Those are not comparable things.

And that’s before you even consider the heft of the decision itself. Choosing a side dish for lunch is not even comparable to divorce.

And that’s also before considering that any vendor who sells anything will “package” things to sell more stuff.

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Count Fleet's avatar

That's economists for you

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Matthias Görgens's avatar

> The same goes when your spouse-to-be asks for hard divorce. In an easy divorce state, this is a seriously positive signal. He puts himself in the top 25% of commitment. In a hard divorce state, in contrast, this is only a moderately positive signal. Asking for hard divorce when hard divorce is the default puts you in the top 75% of commitment.

It's not that easy, if the commitment is symmetric.

For a less emotionally charged topic: notice period for employment contracts (in jurisdictions were firing is generally legal). Does pushing for a long notice period as an worker mean that you are committing yourself to the company? Or does it mean that you want the company to pay you for a long time, even after they've already decided to fire you?

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Count Fleet's avatar

What happens when the "tough divorce box" is for the richer party to forgo the prenup, or for the poor party to accept the prenup? Should the positive signaling force be imposed on the richer party as an effort to induce "noblesse oblige"? Should the status quo be adjusted to minimize the negative signals and what would those be?

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