Shorts to a formal gathering? I'd do it for $100 USD, sir. Just don't tell my fiancée, arrange my invitation and pay for my transportation (and hotel, if required).
Rent control leads to responsible landlords cutting their losses and selling to unscrupulous landlords. When being responsible is punished, the good guys leave and the bad guys move in.
I can attest. I own a rental and I also rented an apartment for a bit in the same town. We have a big property management company that is almost as evil as progressives make out all of them to be. The city seems on a project to design their landlord/tenant policies to address this evil company, but as they are moving in that direction, my incentives are getting stronger to give up and just sell my property to them.
You can “nonconform” by wearing shorts to a formal event or dyeing your hair green. That’s mostly attention-getting. Real nonconformity is living by a principle—like being a conservative professor at an elite college, or an atheist in a religious community. The real thing is dissent rooted in belief—when it risks status, friends, or career.
Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality , Journal of Law and Economics 39: 519-544 (October 1996). In modelling crime, economists have focussed on the expected cost of government sanctions to the criminal, but private sanctions--- notably economic or social stigma--- may be just as important. In the model here, workers decide whether to commit crimes and employers decide how much to pay ex- convicts. In one equilibrium, individuals refrain from crime and economic stigma--- the wage loss from conviction--- is high. In a second, pareto- inferior equilibrium, individuals commit crimes and stigma is low, because employers realize that nonconviction does not imply noncriminality. The model may help to explain large shifts in crime, such as that between 1960 and 1980, in which decreases and increases in government sanctions seem to have asymmetric effects. ( http://rasmusen.org/published/Rasmusen_96JLE.stigma.pdf)
This overlooks a generational variable. At least since the arrival of the boomers, young people have wanted to conform to their peer group and not conform to their parents' generation.
"Thomas Nechyba’s model of welfare and illegitimacy is a nice example. Who would have thought that paying unwed moms for out-of-wedlock births would have led to a lot more of them? "
Did welfare make fathers less inclined to wed the would-be mothers?
I assume that the social disapproval of being an unwed father also declined, but I'm not sure we can ascribe it to economic causes.
LLMs are surprisingly similar. We used to think they would be trained like chess programs, with an optimization function, mathematically making it go as high as possible. Instead, they are mostly trained by having them copy things that people did. And then a tiny little bit of utility-optimization goes on top.
Shorts to a formal gathering? I'd do it for $100 USD, sir. Just don't tell my fiancée, arrange my invitation and pay for my transportation (and hotel, if required).
Dress is $200.
Paypal is best.
lol.
Rent control leads to responsible landlords cutting their losses and selling to unscrupulous landlords. When being responsible is punished, the good guys leave and the bad guys move in.
I can attest. I own a rental and I also rented an apartment for a bit in the same town. We have a big property management company that is almost as evil as progressives make out all of them to be. The city seems on a project to design their landlord/tenant policies to address this evil company, but as they are moving in that direction, my incentives are getting stronger to give up and just sell my property to them.
You can “nonconform” by wearing shorts to a formal event or dyeing your hair green. That’s mostly attention-getting. Real nonconformity is living by a principle—like being a conservative professor at an elite college, or an atheist in a religious community. The real thing is dissent rooted in belief—when it risks status, friends, or career.
Bryan wouldn't know about your first example of nonconformity.
Baaaaaaaaa
(http://rasmusen.org/published/Rasmusen_96EL.oldman.pdf)
Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality , Journal of Law and Economics 39: 519-544 (October 1996). In modelling crime, economists have focussed on the expected cost of government sanctions to the criminal, but private sanctions--- notably economic or social stigma--- may be just as important. In the model here, workers decide whether to commit crimes and employers decide how much to pay ex- convicts. In one equilibrium, individuals refrain from crime and economic stigma--- the wage loss from conviction--- is high. In a second, pareto- inferior equilibrium, individuals commit crimes and stigma is low, because employers realize that nonconviction does not imply noncriminality. The model may help to explain large shifts in crime, such as that between 1960 and 1980, in which decreases and increases in government sanctions seem to have asymmetric effects. ( http://rasmusen.org/published/Rasmusen_96JLE.stigma.pdf)
This overlooks a generational variable. At least since the arrival of the boomers, young people have wanted to conform to their peer group and not conform to their parents' generation.
"Thomas Nechyba’s model of welfare and illegitimacy is a nice example. Who would have thought that paying unwed moms for out-of-wedlock births would have led to a lot more of them? "
Did welfare make fathers less inclined to wed the would-be mothers?
I assume that the social disapproval of being an unwed father also declined, but I'm not sure we can ascribe it to economic causes.
LLMs are surprisingly similar. We used to think they would be trained like chess programs, with an optimization function, mathematically making it go as high as possible. Instead, they are mostly trained by having them copy things that people did. And then a tiny little bit of utility-optimization goes on top.
It's online here: https://archive.org/details/rulingclass031748mbp
if people are sheep, (in the realm of political dynamics), should the Overton window widen or narrow as its centre moves?