Any approach to the foundations of libertarian principles that makes good use of commonly accepted moral ideas is sensible and promising. However, I have some issues with Huemer’s comments as quoted by Caplan.
First, he talks about Rand’s view as being that the right action for anyone in any circumstance is always the most selfish action. It should at the very least be noted that what Rand means by “selfish” is quite different from how just about everyone else uses the term. She is talking about rational self-interest, not the blind pursuit of goals based on unexamined feelings. I do not think Rand’s foundation for libertarianism work (and have not thought that for over 45 years) but her view is not such a pushover.
Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a brilliant and fascinating book but, I agree, he does not even attempt to provide a justification for the rights he posits.
Jan Narveson’s approach builds on work by David Gauthier. This does seem to me to a more promising approach, requiring no strange or implausible metaphysical foundations. It basically comes down to saying that rational people who seriously consider social interactions would agree to rules that look very much libertarianism. That seems right to me. However, it is an abstruse approach that few will find compelling. (Even though it is vastly more plausible that Rawls’ approach.)
Heumer says “I reject egoism, since I believe that individuals have substantial obligations to take into account the interests of others.” I have not (yet) read his books but I wonder where he thinks these obligations come from. For me, obligations arise from choices we make and agreements we make. I don’t see any basis for obligations outside choices and agreements. At the same time, as someone who favors virtue ethics rather than consequentialism or deontology, I see some “obligations” arising from relationships that we did not choose (such as family). These are not really obligations but opportunities to develop and display virtuous behavior.
I would make a distinction between justified legal and political rules on one hand and moral justification on the other. Laws against theft are entirely justified. And yet someone might be morally justified in stealing in certain circumstances (even where coercion is not present). I do NOT see this as an exception to the legal/rights principle. Sometimes behavior is justified even if it really does violate rights. This does not mean anything goes. If I were to find myself in such a situation (e.g. starvation imminent) I would be motivated to compensate for the rights violation.
Having made these points I do find Heumer’s common sense morality approach very reasonable.
It is unfortunate that Heumer’s The Problem of Political Philosphy costs $80 (Kindle) or $89 (paperback). I would like to read it.
You might try your local library (even if they don’t currently have a copy they probably can get one from a branch library).
It’s a brilliant book. I put it on my Christmas list a few years back and my children chipped in for a copy from Amazon (the book is pricey but worth it).
If such libertarian principles are implemented in policy and followed to their logical, extreme real world conclusions, are we guaranteed to preserve the core ideas of those principles which laid out said policy in the first place?
A blunt example:
1) Extreme libertarian open market conditions are created, minimizing regulation and political checks and balances. State power (democratic or authoritarian) to influence market is eliminated.
2) Systemic differences between individuals or their conditions, or biases in market equilibria lead to some agents (orgs or people) accruing extreme amounts of wealth and power.
3) Said agents then use their power for aggression, to coerce others, or to create political authority to their advantage.
2 is reality so can hardly be argued, 3 is something that should be expected to happen as soon as the possibility exists, if such behavior is incentivized (as it often is).
So based just on the quoted parts, I reject the notion that the only way to disagree is by disagreeing with the author's premises. I can disagree due to the possible consequences of suggested policy (I do not actually have a strong opinion on the matter).
I understand the motivation behind your argument but I think it fails. You don't distinguish between economic and political power. They are radically different. Of course, economic power can lead to political power -- but it does so only to the extent that the state controls economic activity. In a minimal or no-state situations, opportunities for converting economic "power" into coercion are minimized. By rejecting libertarianism you create exactly the conditions for coercion that you are concerned about.
|| You don't distinguish between economic and political power.
That's right. I assume sufficiently powerful people or orgs will have coercive power, regardless of the means used to gain that power. For instance, a megacorporation might be able to unilaterally decide that its employees should work until they fall asleep, or else they are fired. If the megacorporation possesses enough economic power for the threat function as coercive (say, the employees risk starvation otherwise), that would make it trivial whether the power was political or economic to begin with.
Another example would be a corporation having so much money that it could pay for a powerful private military. The corporation might then use that military to violently win its objectives. I fail to see how a lack of state intervention makes this any better than a state using the same means.
|| In a minimal or no-state situations, opportunities for converting economic "power" into coercion are minimized.
This sounds nice, but I don't see how this follows.
|| By rejecting libertarianism you create exactly the conditions for coercion that you are concerned about.
I've offered no alternative, so I'm creating no conditions. I'm mostly of the opinion that conditions for coercion are very difficult to eliminate, and I'm not convinced libertarianism does the trick.
It's your step 3 that non-anarchist libertarians object to. The idea is to have a minimal state who's *primary function* is to prevent people, including orgs, from attacking each other with force. That would exclude the private military, and of course ordinary competition prevents the "work until sleep" - unless the employer pays so much more than other employers (to incent employees to work that way), employees will simply quit and go work for a more reasonable employer.
I apologize - I'm not a student of politics - but I fail to see how a state which has been stripped of all of its political power can retain its ability to enforce laws which it cannot influence (political power does grow out of the barrel of a gun). Likewise if said state indeed had enough power to enforce laws, it also has enough power to coerce, and we are back to square one as Huemer's premises 2 and 3 are disregarded, and premise 1 relies on the goodwill of the state.
As for ordinary competition preventing "work until sleep", that relies on market equilibria being in fact adequate, which is against my point 1. We might of course just entertain the possibility that yes, market will in fact solve all possible coercion and that no org will gain or retain sufficient power to create monopoly-like or state-like conditions. Such possibilities I view with sympathetic skepticism, much like their far-left counterparts.
If, of course, we are not discussing radical libertarianism, but some form of compromise between current statism and more free-roaming market capitalism, yes, I agree that competition and state intervention can likely be sufficient to prevent such issues. That wasn't how I interpreted the original post, and if that is the case, my criticism is directed at a more radical version of libertarianism.
Yes, the dream (for non-anarchists) is a state that has the power to coerce but uses it only to deter coercion. That enforces ordinary common law (prevents theft, physical attack, fraud, etc.), and protects the right-to-be-left-alone, but does no more.
All economic history tells us that without state support monopolies collapse - a monopoly that charges above-market prices is always vulnerable to defectors who charge a little less to get a lot of business. Only governments have the power to make that sustainable. So the idea of a single overweening monopoly seems to be unworkable - absent state support.
Any approach to the foundations of libertarian principles that makes good use of commonly accepted moral ideas is sensible and promising. However, I have some issues with Huemer’s comments as quoted by Caplan.
First, he talks about Rand’s view as being that the right action for anyone in any circumstance is always the most selfish action. It should at the very least be noted that what Rand means by “selfish” is quite different from how just about everyone else uses the term. She is talking about rational self-interest, not the blind pursuit of goals based on unexamined feelings. I do not think Rand’s foundation for libertarianism work (and have not thought that for over 45 years) but her view is not such a pushover.
Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a brilliant and fascinating book but, I agree, he does not even attempt to provide a justification for the rights he posits.
Jan Narveson’s approach builds on work by David Gauthier. This does seem to me to a more promising approach, requiring no strange or implausible metaphysical foundations. It basically comes down to saying that rational people who seriously consider social interactions would agree to rules that look very much libertarianism. That seems right to me. However, it is an abstruse approach that few will find compelling. (Even though it is vastly more plausible that Rawls’ approach.)
Heumer says “I reject egoism, since I believe that individuals have substantial obligations to take into account the interests of others.” I have not (yet) read his books but I wonder where he thinks these obligations come from. For me, obligations arise from choices we make and agreements we make. I don’t see any basis for obligations outside choices and agreements. At the same time, as someone who favors virtue ethics rather than consequentialism or deontology, I see some “obligations” arising from relationships that we did not choose (such as family). These are not really obligations but opportunities to develop and display virtuous behavior.
I would make a distinction between justified legal and political rules on one hand and moral justification on the other. Laws against theft are entirely justified. And yet someone might be morally justified in stealing in certain circumstances (even where coercion is not present). I do NOT see this as an exception to the legal/rights principle. Sometimes behavior is justified even if it really does violate rights. This does not mean anything goes. If I were to find myself in such a situation (e.g. starvation imminent) I would be motivated to compensate for the rights violation.
Having made these points I do find Heumer’s common sense morality approach very reasonable.
It is unfortunate that Heumer’s The Problem of Political Philosphy costs $80 (Kindle) or $89 (paperback). I would like to read it.
You might try your local library (even if they don’t currently have a copy they probably can get one from a branch library).
It’s a brilliant book. I put it on my Christmas list a few years back and my children chipped in for a copy from Amazon (the book is pricey but worth it).
Oh, right, the library. I remember going to those. :-)
I’m prohibited from borrowing books my old public library, but that’s an unusual situation.
If you email Heumer he may email you a copy. Most academic authors will.
If such libertarian principles are implemented in policy and followed to their logical, extreme real world conclusions, are we guaranteed to preserve the core ideas of those principles which laid out said policy in the first place?
A blunt example:
1) Extreme libertarian open market conditions are created, minimizing regulation and political checks and balances. State power (democratic or authoritarian) to influence market is eliminated.
2) Systemic differences between individuals or their conditions, or biases in market equilibria lead to some agents (orgs or people) accruing extreme amounts of wealth and power.
3) Said agents then use their power for aggression, to coerce others, or to create political authority to their advantage.
2 is reality so can hardly be argued, 3 is something that should be expected to happen as soon as the possibility exists, if such behavior is incentivized (as it often is).
So based just on the quoted parts, I reject the notion that the only way to disagree is by disagreeing with the author's premises. I can disagree due to the possible consequences of suggested policy (I do not actually have a strong opinion on the matter).
I understand the motivation behind your argument but I think it fails. You don't distinguish between economic and political power. They are radically different. Of course, economic power can lead to political power -- but it does so only to the extent that the state controls economic activity. In a minimal or no-state situations, opportunities for converting economic "power" into coercion are minimized. By rejecting libertarianism you create exactly the conditions for coercion that you are concerned about.
|| You don't distinguish between economic and political power.
That's right. I assume sufficiently powerful people or orgs will have coercive power, regardless of the means used to gain that power. For instance, a megacorporation might be able to unilaterally decide that its employees should work until they fall asleep, or else they are fired. If the megacorporation possesses enough economic power for the threat function as coercive (say, the employees risk starvation otherwise), that would make it trivial whether the power was political or economic to begin with.
Another example would be a corporation having so much money that it could pay for a powerful private military. The corporation might then use that military to violently win its objectives. I fail to see how a lack of state intervention makes this any better than a state using the same means.
|| In a minimal or no-state situations, opportunities for converting economic "power" into coercion are minimized.
This sounds nice, but I don't see how this follows.
|| By rejecting libertarianism you create exactly the conditions for coercion that you are concerned about.
I've offered no alternative, so I'm creating no conditions. I'm mostly of the opinion that conditions for coercion are very difficult to eliminate, and I'm not convinced libertarianism does the trick.
It's your step 3 that non-anarchist libertarians object to. The idea is to have a minimal state who's *primary function* is to prevent people, including orgs, from attacking each other with force. That would exclude the private military, and of course ordinary competition prevents the "work until sleep" - unless the employer pays so much more than other employers (to incent employees to work that way), employees will simply quit and go work for a more reasonable employer.
I apologize - I'm not a student of politics - but I fail to see how a state which has been stripped of all of its political power can retain its ability to enforce laws which it cannot influence (political power does grow out of the barrel of a gun). Likewise if said state indeed had enough power to enforce laws, it also has enough power to coerce, and we are back to square one as Huemer's premises 2 and 3 are disregarded, and premise 1 relies on the goodwill of the state.
As for ordinary competition preventing "work until sleep", that relies on market equilibria being in fact adequate, which is against my point 1. We might of course just entertain the possibility that yes, market will in fact solve all possible coercion and that no org will gain or retain sufficient power to create monopoly-like or state-like conditions. Such possibilities I view with sympathetic skepticism, much like their far-left counterparts.
If, of course, we are not discussing radical libertarianism, but some form of compromise between current statism and more free-roaming market capitalism, yes, I agree that competition and state intervention can likely be sufficient to prevent such issues. That wasn't how I interpreted the original post, and if that is the case, my criticism is directed at a more radical version of libertarianism.
Yes, the dream (for non-anarchists) is a state that has the power to coerce but uses it only to deter coercion. That enforces ordinary common law (prevents theft, physical attack, fraud, etc.), and protects the right-to-be-left-alone, but does no more.
All economic history tells us that without state support monopolies collapse - a monopoly that charges above-market prices is always vulnerable to defectors who charge a little less to get a lot of business. Only governments have the power to make that sustainable. So the idea of a single overweening monopoly seems to be unworkable - absent state support.
Call that what you like.