Deadlocks and Credibility

The central problem of foreign policy is almost the opposite of what almost everyone thinks

The idea of credibility probably looms even larger in foreign policy than in economics. Everyone knows that you can’t trust other countries’ promises of good intentions, right? The reason, supposedly, is that national leaders are tirelessly scheming to advance their national interests — and will happily lie, cheat, and betray rival countries to do so. This, in turn, sustains the international deadlocks that dominate headlines decade after decade.

The obvious solution for the China-Taiwan deadlock, for example, is for Taiwan to pay China, say, $1T to sign a treaty of independence. Unfortunately, the standard view insists, this isn’t credible. China would take the money, then tear up the treaty.

The obvious solution for the Israel-Gaza deadlock, similarly, is for Israel to pay Hamas to officially accept Israel’s right to exist and current borders. In short, to endorse Zionism. But again, the standard view insists that this isn’t credible. Hamas would take the money, then recant.

But if you’re paying attention, this standard view is deeply obtuse. Most countries have a long list of issues where they doggedly refuse to even pretend to negotiate. Which in turn prevents them from double-crossing anyone!

If Taiwan tried to buy its independence from mainland China, the latter’s response would not be, “Sure thing, when do we get our money?” They wouldn’t hastily sign a treaty, then break it at the first opportunity. Instead, China’s leadership would express utter outrage at Taiwan’s insulting betrayal of Chinese nationhood. Cynics might say, “It’s all a ploy to get a higher price,” but they’d be wrong. China’s leadership would reiterate their non-negotiable commitment to the One China Principle — and the deadlock would continue.

In the unlikely event that mainland China did agree to discuss Taiwan’s offer, it would be world-historic news. News that would credibly signal a massive change in China’s relations with not only Taiwan, but the fundamental nature of the regime. Indeed, if China signed this treaty, it would be reasonable to expect the CCP to drop its monopoly on power — or a full-blown rerun of Tiananmen Square. In politics, publicly changing your principles is very rarely a ruse. In fact, it’s more like releasing a genie from a bottle. Once the genie’s out, who knows what he’ll do next?

The same holds even more clearly for the Israeli Gaza conflict. If Hamas took a pile of shekels to officially endorse Zionism, “It’s a trick to get Israel to lower its defenses” is practically the least believable interpretation. Whoever endorsed the treaty would, in effect, be declaring civil war on Palestinians who remained true to anti-Zionism. If they had any sense of self-preservation, the would-be signers would start their quest for peace with a Night of the Long Knives against Palestinian hardliners.

Fanciful scenarios? That’s my whole point. None of this would happen, because in international politics, grandstanding is a far more popular strategy than trickery. As I’ve said before, Idealpolitik, not Realpolitik, rules the world. The popular ideals are generally asinine, but if you don’t take asinine ideals seriously, you don’t understand what’s going on.