Why Not Make Desertion Fast?
Why Not Make Desertion Fast?
A guest post from Ned Dobos
I recently discussed my “make desertion fast” proposal (updated here) with philosopher Ned Dobos over lunch. Though he’s sympathetic, he’s sent me the following two emails outlining possible objections. With Ned’s kind permission…
Hi Bryan,
Thought you might be interested to know that I’m giving a talk at the ISA (International Studies Association) conference on Thursday addressing “Caplan’s proposal” to incentivize desertion. The plan is to set out and respond to a few possible ethical arguments against your proposal (see below for the 3 arguments I’ll be focusing on). I don’t think any of these arguments is convincing, but the people I’ve discussed your proposal with who find it odious are coming from one of these 3 directions as far as I can see.
Ned
Hi Bryan,
I’ve added two more arguments based on feedback from the audience at the ISA conference, in case you want to add these to the guest post. I’ve also given new labels to the first two.
Ned
THE DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ARGUMENT
Soldiers that are participating in their country’s unjust aggression against us are engaged in a serious collective wrongdoing.
If we defuse this threat by killing the soldiers that are participating in it (the WAR option), then we are achieving our defensive aims by punishing these wrongdoers (imposing costs on them)
If we defuse this threat by offering money and relocation to the soldiers that are participating in it (the INCENTIVES option), then we are achieving our defensive aims by effectively rewarding these wrongdoers.
It is better, from the point of view of justice, that wrongdoers be punished rather than rewarded all else equal.
Therefore, from the point of view of justice, the WAR option is preferable to the INCENTIVES option.
THE EQUALITY ARGUMENT
The norms and conventions governing international conflict should be, as far possible, neutral with regard to development-status; that is, they should not inherently favour rich/global north states over poor/global south states.
The norms and conventions governing international conflict should therefore disallow or discourage methods and tactics that only rich countries can take advantage of and that are unavailable to poor countries.
Incentivizing desertion is a tactic that rich countries will be able to use against poor countries but not vice-versa, given vast inequalities in global wealth.
Therefore, our norms and conventions ought to prohibit the practice of incentivising desertion in international armed conflict.
THE MINIMAL NECESSARY HARM ARGUMENT
This is a weird one, and needs some context. In December 2022 Russian fighter pilot Maksim Kuzminov surrendered to Ukraine (along with his aircraft) in return for $500,000 plus amnesty for himself and his family. Kuzminov was found murdered in Spain in February this year. When invited to comment, the director of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, Sergei Naryshkin, said that Maksim had become a “moral corpse” the moment he decided to betray his country for money. The argument goes:
When we are prosecuting a just war against an aggressor, we should not inflict harms on enemy soldiers that are surplus to defensive requirements; that is, we should inflict the minimum amount of harm necessary to neutralise the threat.
To neutralise the threat posed by an aggressor, we can either kill/injure the enemy soldiers (the WAR option) or we can entice them to become traitors by offering cash bribes (the INCENTIVES option).
Being a traitor is worse than being dead. It better to be an actual corpse than a moral corpse!
Killing/maiming enemy soldiers is therefore less harmful to them than an outcome in which they betray their country for money.
Incentivizing desertion is inconsistent with the minimal necessary harm principle.
THE WRONG REASONS ARGUMENT
An incentive is odious if it encourages individuals to do things for the “wrong reasons”.
Financial gain is the wrong reason to participate in war. That decision should always be based purely on patriotic duty and/or a commitment to justice.
Contracts for mercenary services are therefore odious because they encourage people to do things for the wrong reasons.
Financial gain is also the wrong reason to refuse participation in war. This decision can be justified, but personal profit is never a suitable justification.
Desertion incentives are odious for the same reason that mercenary contracts are odious; both encourage individuals to do things for the wrong reasons.
ADDING INSULT TO INJURY
Military service is physically, psychologically, and morally risky.
Our national soldiers often receive inadequate protection against these risks during military operations, and inadequate post-injury care after they are discharged.
If a proportion of the defence budget is put towards desertion incentives, some enemy soldiers will end up gaining a great deal from their encounter with our defence department.
A national soldier that receives inadequate protection and care from the institution that he serves, while that institution enriches members of the enemy force that harmed him, has a legitimate grievance. He is being betrayed, or at the very least insult is being added to injury.
Bryan again. I commend Ned for having the patience to engage such silly and obtuse arguments!
I can't help but notice that every single one of these arguments equally opposes letting the other side's soldiers surrender on the battlefield and become PoWs in the regular way instead of fighting to the death:
1. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE considers killing enemy soldiers an actively good thing, allowing them to surrender and be imprisoned is a lesser penalty and therefore wrong.
2. EQUALITY would be concerned that only wealthy countries can afford to treat their PoWs well, and this would give them an unfair advantage.
3. MINIMAL NECESSARY HARM would consider letting people be cowards and surrender to be a fate worse than death. So we must kill them if they try to surrender, and make this widely known so they won't try and will instead die good patriots.
4. WRONG REASON would tag self-preservation as the same kind of low motive that shouldn't be encouraged. You can surrender because you think Russia is on the wrong side, but not merely to save your own skin.
5. ADDING INSULT TO INJURY says that as long as we have our own soldiers being treated less than optimally, we cannot spend any money on the well-being of enemy soldiers. Since taking them prisoner involves a non-zero expense to house and feed them, better to just shoot them where they stand.
I look forward to seeing people who embrace these arguments arguing against the Geneva convention.
I can think of a few (IMO more plausible) reasons.
1) Most soldiers, economically speaking, overvalue their military worth (i.e., patriotism and the sense of dishonor in desertion may mean you would have to pay them much more than would actually be materially worth it to get them to desert). Only a rarefied few extremely valued, specialized soldiers would be willing to defect for a price that a self-interested, rational agent would be willing to pay (though if you're an altruistic agent who takes the benefit to the bribed soldier into account, it may still be worth it to pay a more or less disposable infantryman to defect more than he's worth for his own sake, even if it's not militarily worth it).
2) This can easily be gamed. People can join the military then immediately desert just to get free money. In fact, if you don't have accurate personnel information on the enemy forces, civilians could put on some fatigues, walk into a base, and collect a check. The enemy government could even exploit this by recruiting large numbers of people to 'enlist' on paper, desert, collect the money, then return to Russia (and who knows, maybe do it again under a different name).
3) There are potential unforeseen downstream responses. E.g., governments may start punishing family members of deserters to counteract the cash incentive soldiers have to desert.