What happened to “price goes down quantity goes up?” The argument could be that the price change came after the beginning of the trend and seems too small to explain the whole phenomenon, but not that it should have no effect at all.
The funny thing with debates about divorce and the cause of the rising rates, at least to me, is that people seem to be conflating the legal process of divorce with the practical, human process of the marriage dying. As Caplan points out, by the time divorce gets contemplated the couple usually hates each other. That would seem to be the outcome we should be interested in avoiding, not the mere legal proceeding that ends the previous legal arrangement. That seems to me to make as much sense as saying we should increase the marriage rate, because married couples have better outcomes, and to do that we can just assign people husbands and wives at 21. I don't think we would expect the better outcomes from being married to hold in that case. Likewise, it isn't entirely clear what the goal of avoiding divorce is supposed to achieve if the people involved hate each other.
I do not claim to be an expert in the Coase theorem, but if two spouses in a marriage have different levels of desire for divorce (i.e. one spouse wants to keep the marriage together, the other doesn't), then a shift in distribution of resources could absolutely make the difference. If the spouse who wants divorce faces a major financial penalty for seeking it, they might not do so, and a potential financial benefit won't swing the other spouse to being in favor of divorce. This is especially true if the law is set up to penalize *whichever party seeks divorce* rather than penalizing "the higher-earning spouse".
Also, as another commentator said, part of the "cost" of divorce was social disapproval/moral censure. Law and culture are mutually reinforcing, and the change in law to no-fault divorce lowered the social cost.
Bryan: great topic and you have merely but scratched the surface.
To another commenter’s point:
Changing the law lowered the social cost to divorce.
I believe the bigger issue is that it changed the dynamic for the types of parties involved and how each values a dollar due to thresholds.
Let’s assume Coase theorem holds. However for a given distribution of assets between parties , there is a threshold below which the weaker or less financially self sufficient partner has a divorce desire of zero. Under the new negotiating Coase event, the wealth and income distribution might put the “weaker” party above the threshold leading to rampant divorce.
Once the pattern was safely established to reduce uncertainty, this could become a rent-seeking pattern with behavior designed around it - for example seeking to maximize youthful years and court ordered guaranteed incomes. That is, the work is no longer by choice. (that’s another topic)
That racket might get good enough where other rent-seekers seek to help the weaker party for a share of the spoils. (This applies to the “harm the other” surplus you describe as well.)
It might even get so bad that even the “stronger” party’s own agents seek to join the rent seeking behavior of the other side in violation of their duties.
Now, now, this I imagine you find fanciful and highly unlikely.
You are probably thinking well gosh if that’s true then there are probably public officers in on the racket…
(And when AbusiveDiscretion.com exposes that , I will surely update you .) meanwhile, indicted ex-alderman Ed Burke’s wife just stepped down as CHIEF Justice of the state Supreme Court, achieved no doubt as result of her legal prowess.
What happened to “price goes down quantity goes up?” The argument could be that the price change came after the beginning of the trend and seems too small to explain the whole phenomenon, but not that it should have no effect at all.
The funny thing with debates about divorce and the cause of the rising rates, at least to me, is that people seem to be conflating the legal process of divorce with the practical, human process of the marriage dying. As Caplan points out, by the time divorce gets contemplated the couple usually hates each other. That would seem to be the outcome we should be interested in avoiding, not the mere legal proceeding that ends the previous legal arrangement. That seems to me to make as much sense as saying we should increase the marriage rate, because married couples have better outcomes, and to do that we can just assign people husbands and wives at 21. I don't think we would expect the better outcomes from being married to hold in that case. Likewise, it isn't entirely clear what the goal of avoiding divorce is supposed to achieve if the people involved hate each other.
I do not claim to be an expert in the Coase theorem, but if two spouses in a marriage have different levels of desire for divorce (i.e. one spouse wants to keep the marriage together, the other doesn't), then a shift in distribution of resources could absolutely make the difference. If the spouse who wants divorce faces a major financial penalty for seeking it, they might not do so, and a potential financial benefit won't swing the other spouse to being in favor of divorce. This is especially true if the law is set up to penalize *whichever party seeks divorce* rather than penalizing "the higher-earning spouse".
Also, as another commentator said, part of the "cost" of divorce was social disapproval/moral censure. Law and culture are mutually reinforcing, and the change in law to no-fault divorce lowered the social cost.
Literature shows that women are the main filers for divorce (Brinig and allen, 2009)
It’s more likely that no-fault divorce legislation was a response to the rises in divorces.
Contra Marx, economic determinism is false. Man chooses to focus or evade.
Bryan: great topic and you have merely but scratched the surface.
To another commenter’s point:
Changing the law lowered the social cost to divorce.
I believe the bigger issue is that it changed the dynamic for the types of parties involved and how each values a dollar due to thresholds.
Let’s assume Coase theorem holds. However for a given distribution of assets between parties , there is a threshold below which the weaker or less financially self sufficient partner has a divorce desire of zero. Under the new negotiating Coase event, the wealth and income distribution might put the “weaker” party above the threshold leading to rampant divorce.
Once the pattern was safely established to reduce uncertainty, this could become a rent-seeking pattern with behavior designed around it - for example seeking to maximize youthful years and court ordered guaranteed incomes. That is, the work is no longer by choice. (that’s another topic)
That racket might get good enough where other rent-seekers seek to help the weaker party for a share of the spoils. (This applies to the “harm the other” surplus you describe as well.)
It might even get so bad that even the “stronger” party’s own agents seek to join the rent seeking behavior of the other side in violation of their duties.
Now, now, this I imagine you find fanciful and highly unlikely.
https://alabnews.com/breaking-dastardly-chicago-divorce-attorneys-hurst-robin-kay-allen-have-own-client-thrown-in-jail/
You are probably thinking well gosh if that’s true then there are probably public officers in on the racket…
(And when AbusiveDiscretion.com exposes that , I will surely update you .) meanwhile, indicted ex-alderman Ed Burke’s wife just stepped down as CHIEF Justice of the state Supreme Court, achieved no doubt as result of her legal prowess.