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Kurt Pieper's avatar

You've surely answered this question before, but under your model, why wouldn't companies proactively (i.e. no talent/applicant has to be contrarian) invent a cheaper proxy themselves to capitalize on the untapped smart-college-age population? This population would then gain "work experience", making the deal attractive to them aswell. (i.e. assuming the hypothetical company in question is prestigious enough such that this makes up for the lack of college degree such a deal would incur)

However, this seems to have not happened so far in the ~free market, which would call the signaling model into question.

If no such cheaper proxy could be devised, e.g. due to conscientiousness being hard to measure, this would make education efficient again (don't believe that, just responding to a possible objection)

Joe Potts's avatar

When I was a young American male, my military obligation interfered with my education. In retrospect, it's hard to decide which was the greater waste (I was not injured or killed). Both were near tragic. Thank God for the "near."

I was successful in school, a failure in the navy. Since both, I've oscillated between these.

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