Popuphobia’s Javier Milei Problem

A guest post by Dan Klein

My dear friend and colleague Dan Klein wrote this. He loves feedback, so please share your thoughts in the comments. And he’d especially appreciate reactions from friends Shikha Dalmia and Nils Karlson, which I’d definitely be glad to run.

P.S. Dan asked me to link to the latest Milei news.

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I define popuphobe as someone who propagates revilement of something that he or she calls ‘populism.’ A leading organ of popuphobia is The UnPopulist, a project of the Institute for the Study of Modern Authoritarianism, led by Shikha Dalmia. Another popuphobe is Nils Karlson, author of Reviving Classical Liberalism Against Populism (2024).

Michael Benz explains that the term populism is now used as a watchword against individuals and movements who challenge certain establishment elites. Benz explains that an unholy skein of institutions and political factions has fashioned a narrative holding that they, the skein, is democracy. The intelligence community, the administrative state, the World Health Organization, the Clinton Foundation, the New York Times, etc. are democracy. Their adversaries—such as Donald Trump—are, therefore, threats to democracy and are reviled as populists.

Dalmia and Karlson theorize about populism is such a way that badness is built into ‘populism.’ Karlson makes a list of features, each of which is necessary to terming a political leader or movement “populist.” One feature is badness, from a classical liberal perspective. In an article at The UnPopulist, Karlson writes: “Populism is the opposite of classical liberalism.” Dalmia, as well, seems to hold that populist implies bad. Neither Karlson nor Dalmia, however, justify building badness into populism.

Like my friends Karlson and Dalmia, I profess classical liberalism. But we differ on populism. My own definition of populism accords with long-standing semantic conventions:

A political movement is populist when it portrays itself as being in opposition to corrupt elites. The elites that matter here are especially those of governmental structures. Populists suggest that a governing class have ensconced themselves into positions of power, that the elites network with one another to serve their own interests rather than the common interest, that they have abused their powers.

I offer that definition in “One Cheer for Populism.” Not three cheers. Not even two. But one. Contrary to what Dalmia and Karlson say, populism is not necessarily bad. It can be good. Indeed, under certain conditions, it may be good’s only hope.

What then is good populism? What is an example?

Milei, the populist

The best current example is Javier Milei of Argentina. He is both populist and good.

Milei’s populist credentials are unimpeachable.  He works in opposition to his country’s established structure and its elites—he dubs them “the caste”—who ruined Argentina. Milei justly blames them for their failures. His personal authority and political movement did not rise out of a traditional political party with a traditional platform.

Wikipedia describes Milei’s populist political trajectory:

During his [2020–2021] campaign for the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, Milei focused on Buenos Aires neighborhoods, where he took strolls and had talks with ordinary people. He pledged not to support any tax increases or new taxes. He ran under the slogan ‘I didn't come here to lead lambs, but to awaken lions’, denouncing what he saw as a political caste, which he said was composed of ‘useless, parasitic politicians who have never worked’. He called politicians ‘rats’, and said they form ‘a parasitic caste’ that thinks only about getting rich. … [H]e promoted his political views on television, radio, and YouTube.

As for the 2023 presidential campaign in Argentina, which Milei won, he ran as part of La Libertad Avanza (Liberty Advances), a recently formed political alliance, not an established political party. Milei’s campaign was thoroughly populist in messaging, appeal, and agenda. As president, Milei has followed through by taking on many of the established elites that he promised to fight.

That Milei is a populist is uncontroversial. The Wikipedia page notes that Milei “has been described politically as a right-wing populist.” Headlines call Milei populist:

Washington Post: “Far-right populist Javier Milei…”

New York Times: “…Javier Milei…is a right-wing populist…”

Associated Press: “Fiery right-wing populist Javier Milei…”

NPR: “Janier Milei, a radical libertarian populist, elected…”

PBS News: “After electing right-wing populist…”

Politico: “Right-wing populist Milei…”

The Guardian: “Far-right populist Milei…”

The Economist: “Argentina’s Populist Political Movement…”

France 24: “Populist Milei wants to dollarize economy”

Milei, the classical liberal

Milei describes himself as libertarian and liberal in the classical sense. Others often call him libertarian. Libertarians and classical liberals justly acclaim Milei. A man who says, “If printing money would end poverty, printing diplomas would end stupidity,” would, I would think, win the hearts of classical liberals. More gems from Milei are here.

Milei’s words are classical liberal. But Milei is now a politician, and a politician’s actions often do not live up to his words.

Milei came into the presidency on 10 December 2023. An assessment of his first year could examine questions including:

1.      Whether his efforts at reform have been classical liberal.

2.      Whether he has succeeded in effecting classical-liberal reforms.

3.      Whether his reforms are generating improvements, which is something that classical liberals would expect classical-liberal reforms to generate.

It is effort (item 1) that we wish to judge, but since our knowledge of sincere effort, based on direct evidence of effort, always remains quite limited, to form a judgment we rely also on other signs (such as items 2 and 3), as explained in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (pp. 104–108).

Regarding Milei’s effecting of classical-liberal reforms, National Review’s Andrew Stuttaford writes in “Javier Milei Takes Up His Chain Saw” (25 July 2024):

Milei revved up the chain saw straight after taking office — and a wave of regulatory reforms and tough, sometimes crude spending cuts made it possible, in June, for Argentina to record six consecutive monthly fiscal and financial surpluses for the first time in years… [A] significantly slimmed-down version of Milei’s giant “omnibus” reform bill, which included wide-ranging deregulation, measures designed to encourage foreign investment, and the go-ahead for (a reduced number of) privatizations has received final approval. Enough of the original survived for Milei to declare victory… Another large deregulatory package, the “Megadecreto,” introduced in December under a procedure that permits the president to change the law in cases of national emergency, will remain in force unless the courts object or it is rejected by the congress. The senate has done so, but the lower house seems (for now) unlikely to follow its lead. One early success was a major deregulation of the rental market.

Cato Institute’s Michael Chapman writes (27 September 2024):

[S]ince taking office, Milei has slashed government spending up to 30%, fired more than 25,000 federal workers, reduced federal agencies, frozen public works projects, lowered a major import tariff, maintained budget surpluses every month, reduced monthly inflation to 4.2% (August 2024) from 25% (December 2023), and is pushing for currency competition among the peso, US dollar, and other currencies.

As for improvements in living in Argentina, month-on-month inflation rates are, according to a post by Ian Bremmer, at a three-year low. Argentina seems to be finding her feet.

Overall, then, in addition to all that Milei claims to be, the signs do indeed suggest classical liberalism. On 18 November 2024, the Cato Institute tweeted: “Javier Milei’s…reforms in Argentina show the power of fiscal responsibility and free markets—echoing Cato’s belief in individual liberty, economic freedom, and peace.”

How do popuphobes handle Milei?

The popuphobes say that a populist cannot be good, and yet Milei is a good populist. How do they handle this challenge?

Karlson on Milei

Karlson does not mention Milei in his 2024 book nor in his subsequent article in The UnPopulist. In a video from the Institute of Economic Affairs with Nils Karlson, the case of Milei is brought up. The proper way for Karlson to respond to that question would have been to say either that Milei is not a populist or that Milei is not classical liberal. But Karlson says neither of those things. Besides saying that he wishes Milei luck, Karlson speaks of “the rule of law” to cast some doubt on Milei’s claim to being a good liberal, as though Milei may transgress Argentina’s rule of law. The rule of law deserves a sacred regard. But in its broad and deep sense, law is a many-layered thing. Controversy will persist as to whether an action constitutes a departure from norms and conventions or a redressing of previous departures. We cannot expect real efforts at correcting a corrupt government not to be ferociously combatted and not to be decried as unprecedented violations of established convention. As for Milei, to my knowledge he has not committed patent violations of Argentina’s legal rules or fundamental political conventions.   

The UnPopulist on Milei

I searched their archive (at Substack) on “Javier Milei.” The archive contains 456 articles (as of 17 November 2024), going back to August 27, 2021.

Of those 456 articles, I found only two articles in which Javier Milei is mentioned. The dearth of mentions of Milei is remarkable for a publication that presents itself as liberal and as concerned with populism. Let’s take a look at the two articles that do mention Milei.

The more recent one, published 18 May 2024, is insignificant for our purposes. Milei is mentioned only because the author briefly tells the reader what someone who goes by “Bronze Age Pervert” thinks about Milei.

The other one is lengthy and more telling. The title is “Javier Milei: An Illiberal Libertarian?” by David Agren, published 4 April 2024. Beneath the main title is the lead-in: “The Argentine president’s socially conservative populism might trump his free market economics”. Early in the article the author reiterates: “when we dig through Milei’s emergence and his curious mix of policies and populist rhetoric, it is clear he is no consistent classical liberal.” Thus does Agren try to parry the Milei challenge, not by denying that Milei is a populist, but by denying that he is a classical liberal. Yet when thoughtful readers dig through Agren’s essay of 2800 words, it is clear he has very little to substantiate his headline detractions of Milei. When we get down to brass-tacks, we find Agren:

• fussing over Milei’s dislike of abortion while noting that Milei “ultimately disavowed” an effort to overturn the decriminalization of abortion,

• claiming in passing that Milei “raised taxes on imports and exports” (but see update here),

• quoting a Milei detractor who claims in passing that Milei “escalates the drug war,”

• and mentioning Milei’s views on foreign policy.

Other than that, Agren can only lob empty cant against Milei’s liberal credentials, saying, for example, that Milei’s agenda “requires economic upheaval” which “could mean less freedom.” Agren is unfair, in that we all know that classical liberals will disagree on thorny issues like abortion, foreign policy, and fiscal continence, and that winning and actually governing are compromising callings.

Course correction

Over the past eight years, events and developments have taken me by surprise. Most remarkable has been the turn toward virulent anti-liberalism. Never before had I imagined that the powers that be, and institutions at large, could behave so wickedly.

Nearly as shocking to me has been the reaction of many of my libertarian and classical liberal friends and associates. The corruption of elites has been exposed daily, as well as the blatant weaponization of powers and the propagation of big lies. I have trouble understanding how my friends and associates could not be appalled as I am. How can they not see where the greatest threats to liberty lie?

It is as though they do not want to face the possibility that our elite institutions are deeply corrupted.

Over the past eight years I have come to think of the United States as an erstwhile ‘first-world’ country. We become ‘second world’, like China, or ‘third world,’ like Argentina—countries in which governmental elites are deeply and systematically corrupt.

How could someone who calls himself classical liberal not root for Javier Milei? Milei is pushing back the enemies of liberty.

And he is populist.

When popuphobes are faced with a confound to their “populism bad” belief, they elide the confound or explain it away and carry on with popuphobia. I find it remarkable.

The good can be advanced by populism. In the Acts of the Apostles, it is written: “[T]he captain with the officers…were afraid of being stoned by the people” (Acts 5: 26).

Daniel Klein is professor of economics and JIN Chair at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. He is the author of Central Notions of Smithian Liberalism.